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SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TAB E

COMMUNIST BW CAPABILITIES IN KOREA THE KOREAN AREA

OFFENSIVE

1. There is no proof of Chinese Communist or North Korean biological research for the express purpose of waging biological warfare. Available intelligence ~~on~~ Communist BW capabilities in the Korean area is almost entirely concerned with possible CCF activities, although it must be assumed that some technical interchange takes place between Chinese ^{Communists} and North Koreans.

2. Intelligence indicates that the Chinese Communist Government may have established a small, basic, and applied laboratory BW research program. This program is probably carried out in three scientific institutes located in North China and Manchuria. Research appears to be centered on enteric diseases of man and selected food-crop-killing hormones.

3. Top control of the BW research program probably rests in the "Chinese Communist Military Council"; technical assistance is obtained from specialists in the various research institutes. Control by the Council is exercised through three main scientific institutes in areas where the requisite laboratory facilities are already available for biological research. The principal institutes are at Peiping; (Peiping Scientific Research Institute); Chang Chun (The People's Army Chemical Warfare School and Research Laboratory under the Northeast Scientific

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Institute); and Peian (Paichia Special Diseases Research Institute). Other institutes possibly connected with the Chinese Communist program are located at Harbin (branch of the Continental Scientific Research Institute); Mukden (Cattle Disease Research Laboratory); and Dairen (the Dairen Sanitary Research Laboratory).

4. The Chinese BW program, intimately related to the CW program, is reported to be closely supervised and supported by the USSR. Soviet Chinese are prominent in the research program. Soviet personnel participate as directors of the principal laboratories, and as many as 50% of the research scientists and technicians are reportedly Soviet. In addition, technical personnel are reportedly Soviet; 120 Japanese specialists integrated into the from the former Kwantung Army BW units have been put to work by the program by the Chinese Communists.

5. Reported work of these facilities and scientists cover bubonic plague, typhoid, cholera, and other intestinal diseases. The Chang Chun institute has facilities closely associated with airfields; however, there is no evidence to confirm or deny actual employment of aircraft in munition or agent tests. Likewise, there is no evidence from the other research centers to indicate pilot-plant or large-scale BW production, field testing of agents, or development and ~~test~~ of BW munitions and equipment.

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US

6. Recent tests by the Army Chemical Corps have served to illustrate the ease with which limited targets can be attacked with BW agents. In view of the results of these tests, it seems probable that the Communists could, in limited areas, sabotage South Korean crops, wells, municipal water systems, and populated points targets with BW agents.

DEFENSIVE

7. BW defensive capabilities are closely tied to the public health system, medical facilities, and medical supplies. In China and Korea all three are very poor. The Communists are attempting to improve these in their basic public health program; such improvement, when realized, will be of value in combating BW.

8. The Chinese Communist Government announced in 1951 an expansion of epidemic control and prevention units, and expenditure of large sums for medical and sanitation work. Although inoculations against contagious diseases have been reported, it is doubtful if a significant percentage of the population has been protected. Many CCF HW's in Korea report that inoculations are incomplete or entirely omitted. The Soviets have been aiding and advising the Communists in China and Manchuria particularly regarding plague prevention and control of plague; whether this Soviet interest is primarily benevolent or is associated with the BW program is not known.

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9. It is possible that Soviet developments in BW equipment and munitions might be made available (at least in design) to the Communists in Korea if it was determined that BW should be employed. However, in view of the Communists' relatively poor defensive capability vis-a-vis US defensive capability, large-scale employment of BW with Soviet munitions, agents, and the necessary concurrent air superiority, is considered highly unlikely.

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